For want of doubt, go straight to the most basic economic metric we have—real compensation per labor hour. The latter metric not only deletes the inflation from the pay figures, but also measures the totality of worker compensation, including benefits for health care, retirement, vacation, disability, sick leave and other fringes.

Needless to say, the purple line below makes crystal clear that historic worker gains have ground to a complete halt.

Per Annum Increase In Real Hourly Compensation:

• Q1 1947 to Q1 2001: +1.79%.
• Q1 2001 To Q1 2020: +0.71%.
• Q1 2020 to Q2 2024: -0.01%.

It doesn’t get any cleaner than this. No matter how the White House, the Fed and the fawning financial press cherry pick the “incoming data” you flat-out can’t say the US economy is “strong” when the growth of the inflation-adjusted pay envelope of 161 million workers has deflated to the vanishing point. Indeed, it has literally been dead in the water for the last 52 months running.

Real Nonfarm Worker Compensation per Hour, 1947 to 2024

Moreover, the above graph covers all workers, from the bottom to the top end of the wage scale. But when you look at the most recent trends for the highest paid jobs in the durable goods manufacturing sector, the stagnation has been even more dramatic. There has been zero net gain in real compensation per hour in this high-pay sector during the last 15 years; and an obvious contributor to that baleful outcome has been the surge of inflation since 2020 when Washington went off the deep-end with fiscal stimmies and upwards of $5 trillion of newly minted central bank credit.

And we do mean deep-end. During the one-year pandemic stimmy bacchanalia, Washington spent $6.5 trillion on a one-time basis or 150% of the regular Federal budget for war, welfare and everything else as of 2019. At the same time, the Fed printed $5 trillion of new credit during the 30 months between October 2019 and March 2022, which was more than it had printed during the first 106 years of its existence!

In any event, these reckless fiscal and monetary policies had long since caused much of the high productivity, high-pay industrial sector to be off-shored. Yet that happened not because free market capitalism has a death wish in America. It happened because Washington policies generated so much internal cost and nominal wage inflation that vendors of goods to the retail markets had no choice except to source from far lower dollar cost venues abroad, and most especially China and its associated supply chains.

Inflation-Adjusted Compensation in Durable Goods Manufacturing, 2010 to 2024

Nor is this just a manufacturing sector issue. The fact is, stagnation and shrinkage has afflicted the entire goods-producing sector of the US economy, including energy production and mining and gas and electric utility production. As shown below, during the heyday of American economic growth after WWII, these sectors were the motor force of prosperity. Between 1947 and 1978:

• Real hourly earnings (purple line) in good-producing doubled, rising by 23% per annum.
• Total hours worked (black line) increased by nearly 20%.

Since that late 1970s peak, however, no cigar with respect to either pay rates or total hours worked. In fact, by 2023–

• Real hourly pay was down by 2% versus 1979, meaning it had stagnated for 45 years!
• Total hours worked were even more debilitated, having been rolled all the way back to the late 1940s level.

That’s right. There were once 24 million high paying jobs in the good-producing sectors, which represented more than 28% of total US employment of 90 million in 1979. But by 2023, total hours worked in the goods-producing sectors have fallen to levels first achieved 75 years earlier.

Goods-Producing Sector: Index Of Real Hourly Wages Versus Index of Total Hours Worked, 1947 to 2023

In light of the above, all of the Biden-Harris palaver about a “strong” economy actually gives the concept of humbug a bad name. Like the claims of the Trump Administration before them, it is based on such egregious manipulation and cherry-picking of the data as to amount to the classic Big Lie, if there ever was one.

The fact is, neither every job counted by the BLS nor every dollar of GDP computed by the Commerce Department is created equal when it comes to economic significance. And it is exactly low pay/low productivity “jobs” and government-fueled “GDP” which has accounted for much of the ballyhooed “strength” of the US economy in recent years and decades.

For instance, at the time that good-producing employment peaked in 1979, jobs in the low-pay, minimum wage, episodic employment Leisure & Hospitality sector were just beginning to attain lift-off. During the next 45-years, hours worked in the later sector rose by +128%, even as the index for goods-producing hours per the black lines (both above and below) fell by -18%.

Needless to say, the economic weight of the purple line is only a fraction of that implicated in the black line. For instance, hours worked in the Leisure & Hospitality (L&I) sector average just 23.9 per week and average wages currently stand at $19.66 per hour. This computes to an annual pay equivalent of just $24,400 per L&I “job”.

By contrast, the equivalent figures for the goods-producing sector are 40.6 hours per week, $31.26 per hour pay rates and an annual equivalent of $66,000 in gross pay. That is to say, in terms of economic throw-weight a L&I “job” is equal to only 37% of a goods-producing “job”.

Index of Total Hours Worked: Leisure & Hospitality Sector Versus Good-Producing, 1978 to 2023

Not surprisingly, therefore, the Biden-Harris claims about 15.9 million jobs “created” on their watch should be taken with a grain of salt.

In the first place, about 9.1 million of these purported new jobs or 58% were actually “born-again jobs”. That is, jobs that were lost during the massive lay-offs triggered by UniParty lockdowns during 2020-2021 that have been subsequently recovered. Specifically, the total nonfarm job count peaked at 152.05 million jobs in February 2020 versus the 158.78 million total posted in August 2024.

So the net gain of 6.73 million jobs is a far cry from the nearly 16 million gain ballyhooed by Biden-Harris, which includes all the born-again ones.

But that’s not the half of it. When you look at the net gain of 6.73 million jobs, only 763,000 or 11% were in the good-producing sector. By contrast, 2.54 million or 38% of the net new jobs on the Biden-Harris Watch were in the low-pay or low productivity L&H, retail, government or private education and health sectors.

Indeed, these data remind that the GDP numbers reflect the same misleading distortions. Since Q1 2007, for instance, the health care sector has expanded in real terms by 57.4% compared to just 35.7% for the balance of real GDP. Likewise, since Q4 2020, the health care sector has expanded by 17.2% in real terms or nearly double the 9.8% gain for all other components of real GDP.

Then again, the health care sector is overwhelmingly a ward of the state via Medicare/Medicaid and upwards of $300 billion per year in tax subsidies for employer-sponsored health plans. So it’s a case of “if you spend it, it will grow.”

Index Of Real Health Care PCE Versus Total Real GDP, Q1 2007 to Q2 2024

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Needless to say, neither household incomes nor the overall US economy have grown at anything near those magnitudes. For instance, nominal GDP is up by 24X or less than half the gain in housing values since Q2 1971. As a consequence, the value of owner-occupied housing relative to GDP has climbed steadily higher over the last 50 years:

Market-Value of Owner-Occupied Housing As % of GDP Since 1971:

• Q2 1971: 79%.
• Q2 1987: 117%.
• Q4 2006: 172%.
• Q1 2024: 175%.

Market Value of Owner-Occupied Real Estate And % Of GDP, 1970 to 2024

Here’s the thing. The US economy was downright healthy in 1971. During the 18 years between 1953 and 1971 real median family income rose from $38,400 to $62,700 or by a robust 2.8% per annum. So the fact that residential housing represented only 79% of GDP at that point was not indicative of some grave deficiency or structural malfunction in the US economy.

Indeed, when you note that real median family income rose by only 0.8% per annum during the most recent 18 year period, or by just 29% of the 1953-1971 rate, you might well conclude that it would have been wise to leave well enough alone. Not only was the main street economy prospering mightily, but it was being accomplished with honest interest rates owing to Fed policy that was constrained by the Breton Woods gold exchange standard and also by the sound money philosophy that prevailed in the Eccles Building during the William McChesney Martin era.

As shown below, the 10-year UST benchmark rate during that period exceeded the CPI inflation rate by more than 200 basis points most of the time, save for brief periods of recession. Yet the US economy thrived, real living standards rose steadily and the residential housing market literally boomed.

Inflation-Adjusted Yield On 10-Year UST, 1953 to 1971

The subsequent period between 1971 and 1987, of course, was racked first by the double digit inflation of the 1970s and then the brutally high nominal interest rates that issued from the Volcker Cure during the first half of the 1980s. But by 1986 consumer inflation was back to just below 2% and heading lower, thereby paving the way for interest rates to normalize to a low inflation economy.

But the new Fed chairman, Alan Greenspan, had other ideas. Namely, the notion that “disinflation” as opposed to no inflation was good enough for government work; and also that the Fed could actually improve upon the jobs and income performance of the main street economy via what he labeled the “wealth effects” doctrine. That is, if the Fed kept Wall Street percolating happily and the stock indices rising robustly, the increased wealth among households would kindle capitalist animal spirits, thereby fueling enhanced spending, investment, growth, jobs and incomes.

Notwithstanding Greenspan’s mumbling and opaque messaging, what he was doing actually amounted to monetary humbug as old as the hills. He launched an era in which real interest rates were pushed steadily and artificially lower to the zero bound and below on the theory that rates well below what would otherwise prevail under honest supply and demand conditions on the free market would elicit an enhanced level of economic growth and prosperity.

It never happened on a sustained basis, of course, because below market interest rates only cause an accumulation of above normal debt levels in the public and private sectors alike—along with widespread economic distortions and malinvestment on main street, unsustainable leveraged speculation on Wall Street and, at best, the swapping of more economic activity today for reduced activity and higher debt service tomorrow.

In any event, the inflation-adjusted benchmark US Treasury rate marched virtually downhill for the next three decades, ending deep in negative territory by the early 2020s. The ill-effects were widespread throughout the economy and in this instance turbo-charged by the deep tax preferences for home mortgages. So the inflow of cheap debt into the residential housing market was massive and sustained.

There is no mystery as to why: Economic law says that when you subsidize something heavily, you get more of it. And the implicit Fed subsidies depicted in the graph below were heavy indeed.

Inflation-Adjusted Yield On the 10-Year UST, 1987 to 2024

Needless to say, economic law had its way with the residential mortgage market. Big time. Household mortgage debt (black line) had stood at $325 billion or just 50% of household wage and salary income (purple line) back in 1971. But by the peak of the subprime borrowing spree in 2008-2009, mortgage debt had risen by 33X to nearly $11 trillion.

Consequently, the mortgage debt burden soared to 170% of household wage and salary income before abating modestly during the period since 2009. But the point is, the Fed’s severe interest rate repression during that period caused a financial arms race in the residential housing market—with ever more debt pushing housing prices ever higher.

In short, it wasn’t the free market or even steadily rising, albeit more slowly growing, GDP that caused residential housing values to go from 79% of GDP in 1971 to 175% of GDP at present. Instead, it was a sustained, fiat credit fueled tidal wave of housing price inflation—a financial torrent that bestowed large windfalls on earlier period buyers (i.e. Baby Boomers) while progressively squeezing later comers and income and credit-challenged households out of the so-called American Dream of home ownership.

Indeed, the housing inflation tsunami was by no means an equal opportunity benefactor. One study based on the Fed’s periodic survey of consumer finances, in fact, showed that between 2010 and 2020 upper income households, defined as those having an average income of $180,000, saw their collective housing investments rise from $4.5 trillion to $10.3 trillion. That was a 130% gain in just one decade!

By contrast, the housing investment value held by lower income households, defined as having an average income of $29,000, rose from $4.46 trillion to, well, $4.79 trillion. That’s a piddling gain of just 3.5%, which amounted to a double digit lost when you account for the 19% plus rise in the CPI during the same 10-year period.

Household Mortgage Debt and Mortgage % of Wage and Salary Income, 1971 to 2009

To be sure, the Fed heads were not explicitly trying to redistribute wealth to the top of the economic ladder, although that’s most surely what happened. Instead, the whole theory of interest rate repression was that it would stoke a higher level of spending and investment than would otherwise occur, and especially so in the residential housing sector.

Needless to say, no cigar on that front. Residential housing completions per capita and residential housing investment as a % of GDP have been heading relentlessly southward every since Nixon rug-pulled the dollar’s anchor to gold and unleashed the Federal Reserve to foist monetary central planning on the main street economy.

As depicted by the black line, for instance, residential housing investment as a percent of GDP dropped from 5.7% in 1972 to just 3.9% in 2023. The only deviation from this steady downward trend was in 2003-2006, which is to say the very interval during which Bernanke’s first experiment with 1% money fueled the subprime mortgage and house price inflation disaster.

In fact, the chart below paired with the first one above with respect to nearly $50 trillion value of homeowner occupied real estate tells you all you need to know about the folly of Keynesian central banking. To wit, artificially cheap money does not stimulate higher levels of real output and income over time; it merely causes existing assets to be bid-up and inflated in the secondary markets.

In turn, the systematic and relentless inflation of existing assets confers windfall gains and losses on the public in an entirely capricious manner but with the perverse effect of redistributing wealth to the top of the economic ladder. The Fed’s entire financial repression model is therefore not only pointless and ineffective—it’s profoundly iniquitous, too.

Per Capita Private Housing Units Completed and Residential Investment % of GDP, 1972 to 2023

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